Misunderstanding Iran's reformists
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News about Iran's presidential election has dominated the western media in recent days. An election in a regional power has rarely aroused such attention. But the coverage has been more extensive than enlightening.
Before the election, many western news organizations predicted that the reformist candidate Hussein Mousavi would unseat incumbent president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad but, in the event, the Iranian authorities declared that Ahmadinejad the victor by a large margin. The media are making a similar mistake in their assessment of the post-election demonstrations. Headlines suggesting a chaotic outcome have appeared in all the major newspapers. But there is little evidence that the unrest is going to end up as a "color revolution", or threaten Iran's Islamic system of government.
The media coverage reflects the kind of wishful thinking described by American political scientist Robert Jervis in his excellent work Perception and Misperception in International Politics. By exaggerating the influence of Iran's reformists the media are merely projecting their own desire to see a more liberal, pro-western Iranian president.
There is no doubt that there is a reformist trend in Iran represented by figures like Mousavi, who was Iran's prime minister during its war with Iraq, and former president Mohammad Khatami. In contrast to Ahmadinejad, they stand for a relaxation of social and political restrictions and a more moderate foreign policy based on engagement with the western world.
But there are two major misunderstandings about Iran's reformists. The first misunderstanding is to overestimate their influence, and is reflected in the expectations that Mousavi would unseat Ahmedinejad. The reformist current is largely made up of the urban middle class, intellectuals and scholars. This is not to deny that reformists have considerable influence on Iranian politics. They are adept at expressing their ideas and demands and are located in the main political and economic centers, which explains why they were expected to win the election, and why their post-election protests have reverberated around the world.
But those who shout the loudest are not necessarily the most powerful. Though a majority in big cities like Tehran, the reformists do not necessarily have the support of the majority in the country as a whole, as it seems Ahmedinejad's Islamo-nationalists do. And, unlike Hashemi Rafsanjani's pragmatists, they do not control major economic resources or key political positions. Electoral manipulation and fraud, even if proved to have taken place, cannot fully explain why the reformists lost the election by such a large margin.
The second misunderstanding is about the relationship between the reformists and other factions, and the Islamic system as a whole. Words like "conflict", "violence", "tension" and "fury" in newspaper headlines give the impression that the differences between the factions are irreconcilable. But this is almost certainly not the case.
The reformists and Islamo-nationalists have significant differences. The post-election demonstrations reflect the profound dissatisfaction of the reformists and pragmatists with Ahmadinejad's policies. Ahmadinejad's aggressive nuclear policy over the last four years has led the country into international isolation and economic sanctions, caused direct economic losses to the pragmatists and damaged the investment environment. And his reinforcement of social restrictions has irked the urban middle-class.
But that is only one side of the story; the other is that the different factions have common roots and interests. Mousavi, as much as Khamenei or Rafsanjani, is a disciple of Ayatollah Khomeini, and was one of the co-founders of the Islamic system. It is extremely unlikely that Mousavi would continue to encourage a protest that escalated to the extent that it challenged the Islamic Republic itself.
Western media believe that Mousavi, if elected, would adopt a more moderate position on the nuclear issue. But Mousavi said during his campaign that, while he would negotiate with the west, he would not give up Iran's right to develop nuclear power. That is to say, Mousavi differs with Ahmadinejad, about means, not ends.
Iran is an important country with direct influence on the security of the Middle East and the world at large. Its international relations depend on not only how Iranians perceive the world but also how the world perceives Iran. The west has a major responsibility for shaping the world order and should assess the situation in Iran accurately and objectively. If it does not do so, successful engagement will become impossible.
Dr. Liangxiang Jin is a research fellow with the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS), specialized on the Middle East international politics
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