The third-round six-party talks on the nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula will begin this week as scheduled. The questions regarding how this round of six-party talks proceed, what is to be discussed and what result will be achieved in the talks are all the concerns of the world.

Among all these questions, "talks" is the key word that provides much food for thought. In today's world, the possibility for political solutions of many international hot issues is lost either due to the rampancy of unilateralism, or due to "violence for violence" that causes the deterioration of the situation.

By contrast, the fact that the parties involved can finally choose to sit down for talks on the Korean Peninsular nuclear issue represents a ray of hope in the state of chaos, and talks signify the possibility for peaceful solution and political solution.

Solving the disputes over the Korean Peninsular nuclear issue through peace talks is a wise choice made by the parties concerned after making a correct assessment of the situation and balancing their interests. The Korean Peninsular nuclear issue is both historical and practical; both bilateral and multilateral; both principled and pragmatic; both urgent and allowing no impatience. On this multilateral diplomatic stage of the six-party talks, the political will, diplomatic wisdom, negotiating patience and compromising ability of the various parties concerned are undergoing severe tests.

Solid steps have so far been taken toward the talks. When the first-round talks opened in August last year, what people were more concerned about was whether the parties concerned that once refused to talk could start talk and carry it on. After the second round of six-party talks held in February this year, people were even more concerned about whether the talks could produce results and end up in peace.

After two rounds of talks, the already mechanism-based six-party talks in Beijing have quite distinctly defined their own missions: to achieve the goal of making the Korean Peninsula nuclear free and maintaining peace and stability in the peninsula, the various relevant parties have striven to peacefully solve the nuclear issue through dialogs. Their code of conduct is to solve the nuclear issue and other related points of concern through taking coordinated steps.

In the process from rejecting talks to finally sitting down for talks, from doubts about whether the second round of talks can be held after the first round of talks to the third round of talks held as scheduled, from the objective, way and code of conduct of the six-party talks and the formulation of mechanism to starting getting to know each other's ideas about settling substantive questions, the achievements gained in the six-party talks over the past 10 months are obvious.

If more efforts were devoted to setting up platforms and formulating rules in the first two rounds of six-party talks, then the third round of six-party talks should, as a matter of course, enter discussions on substantive matters. Discussions on substantive questions concern the interested countries' security strategy, national economy and people's livelihood and other fundamental policies, so how large the degree of sensitivity, subtlety and difficulty is self-evident.

The United States consistently insisted that the DPRK must abandon nuke in a "thorough, verifiable and irreversible form", and once refused to discuss the question concerning nuclear freeze as the first step toward nuclear abandonment. After two round of talks, the various parties all exhibited flexibility, agreeing to take DPRK's nuclear freeze as the first step toward its final nuclear abandonment. A pitching-in was thus found for the settlement of the Korean Peninsular nuclear issue.

However, after a principled agreement was reached by various parties on taking nuclear freeze as the first step toward DPRK's nuclear abandonment, the focal points that followed were what, after all, are the measures relevant to Korean nuclear freeze and what are the concrete contents of these relevant measures in the political, economic and security aspects, and how to define the condition and opportunity for implementation of these corresponding measures. In the face of such practical problems and with a high demand on the character of operation, the answer that can be made by the third-round six-party talks that has already entered the crucial stage is indeed the concerns.

People can, of course, show their concerns over the matter, but it is inappropriate for them to place too high expectations. Factors such as grievances accumulated over the years, conflict of immediate interests, different security strategies, plus the approaching US general election, indicate that the fundamental solution of the Korean Peninsular nuclear issue will be a long-term, arduous process involving even the reversals. The third-round talks are only a link in this long process. When people understand this, they will place less expectation of the so-called "sensational effect" while observing the third-round talks. Instead they will have a more cautious, normal state of mind.

(People's Daily June 22, 2004)