Southeast Asia's current perspective on cross-Straits relations is premised on three fundamental views:

Southeast Asian or ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries all unequivocally accept the "one-China" policy, as spelled out by Beijing.

ASEAN countries have made it clear they do not want cross-Straits relations to "get out of control," thus bringing instability to the whole region. This in turn would deter foreign investments and disrupt trade flows, thereby plunging ASEAN into a crisis, especially at a time when its investment credibility has declined and stability is less assured within the present geo-strategic and geo-economic context.

Cross-Straits relations are also fundamentally determined by the significant advance of ASEAN-China relations in all aspects, and the accompanying decline in ASEAN-Taiwan relations, despite Taiwan's "Go South" policy towards Southeast Asia.

This aspect of "advancing ASEAN-China ties and cooperation" within the context of the Chinese mainland's "peaceful rising" is a phenomenon that Taipei can no longer afford to ignore in its own strategic calculations, especially in developing cross-Straits relations.

Much has been focused on the spectacular rise of China. Southeast Asia has certainly taken notice -- especially its media, its elite and power brokers, and its official government lines, which focus either on China's economic emergence or its social and political transformation. Beijing's relations with ASEAN could therefore provide one of the best indicators of the mainland's growing impact on the region, with clear negative implications for Taiwan on its cross-Straits relations and development.

Taiwan has in fact been calling on its entrepreneurs to "Go South" (towards ASEAN countries) since the "presidencies" of Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, but with starkly limited success. The intent of this "Go South" policy is clearly to lessen Taiwan's economic dependence on and links with the Chinese mainland, for fear of untoward strategic implications, especially in the event of cross-Straits tensions or conflict.

This also represents Taiwan's attempt to wean ASEAN away from China, in their context of "mutual competition." But Taipei's "Go South" policy appears to be in tatters today, given the "advancing ASEAN-China ties and cooperation" over the past eight years.

The failure of such a policy is obvious. Not only have Taiwanese entrepreneurs increased their investment in and economic links with the mainland, but their investments in ASEAN countries have been stalled or reduced, thanks partly to the relative "decline" of ASEAN countries' competitiveness as well as ASEAN's heightened geo-political risks.

Taiwanese entrepreneurs have refused to follow Taipei's line out of economic and business pragmatism.

Meanwhile, another important shift has been taking place in Southeast Asia, which could spell the complete demise of its "Go South" policy altogether, just as Beijing appears to have inaugurated its own policy of consolidating links with ASEAN since 1997, but with predictably greater success to date.

ASEAN-China relations have clearly consolidated. The successful strengthening of ASEAN-China relations now constitutes a real challenge to the island's foreign policy, as cross-Straits relations remain uncertain and tense, especially after the recent inauguration of "president" Chen Shui-bian for a second term in office.

Southeast Asia's perspectives on cross-Straits relations should be seen through the prism of the following factors which have helped cement ASEAN-China relations:

China's political posturing (of stabilization and normalization of relations) and its assurances of "peaceful rising" and a strategic engagement with Southeast Asia through the ASEAN Regional Forum, Greater Mekong Sub-Region, and its signing of ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.

Growing economic and political opportunities in the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area, as well as in helping to propel growth in ASEAN through increasing bilateral trade, investments, tourism and human resource development cooperation.

The rise of China's "soft power" in Southeast Asia (through economic and social relations and cultural ties) as well as the increasing role of ethnic Southeast Asian Chinese in "bridging" the ASEAN-China connection.

Southeast Asia's official acceptance and recognition of Beijing's one-China policy at the Foreign Ministers' Retreat in Halong Bay, Vietnam in April is a clear indication that ASEAN will perceive future cross-Straits relations through the prism of its own consolidated relations with Beijing.

Taiwan should acknowledge the failure of its "Go South" policy and re-examine cross-Straits relations in this new light.

(China Daily June 21, 2004)