The second round of six-party talks on the Korean Peninsula nuclear standoff wrapped up in Beijing on February 28 with all participants prepared to negotiate on substantive issues and enhance their understanding of other parties' positions. 

Attaching great importance to this hard-won opportunity for negotiations, all parties made full preparation for the talks and prepared respective proposals.

The four-day session ended with a chairman's statement that conveyed all sides' assurances they will continue to seek a peaceful resolution in a spirit of mutual respect and consultation, conducted on an equal footing, to address the nuclear issue and related concerns.

The consensus on the timing of the next round of talks for June and the establishment of a working group laid a foundation for smooth continued negotiations.

However, there still exist fierce differences between the participants on several key points. In particular the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United States need to address their differences in further rounds of discussions.

The deadlock lies on the definition and sphere of abolishing nuclear programs, since relevant parties can hardly reach consensus.

Kim Kye-gwan, deputy foreign minister of the DPRK, reaffirmed his government's official stance that the country should be suitably compensated if it suspends its nuclear program.

Economic aid is the key to Pyongyang freezing and then dismantling its nuclear program, while Washington has said a freeze is not enough. The United States has asked the DPRK to first scrap "all" its nuclear programs.

First, should the DPRK's nuclear plan be "abandoned" or "frozen" when the first-phase measures are taken? Pyongyang's discourse is to "halt" while Washington is demanding "abolishment." The US later said "freezing" is acceptable but it should be understood as the first step of "abolishment" and that it could be inspected as well.

Second, what is the compensation for the DPRK freezing its nuclear program? The DPRK suggested the United States remove it from the list of "countries supporting terrorism," suspend economic, military and political sanctions and provide energy aid. The United States indicated the DPRK could only get a temporary security guarantee jointly signed by the other five parties.

Third, who should provide the DPRK with the security guarantee -- the US side only, or the multiple sides?

The DPRK first proposed that it and the United States should sign a bilateral non-aggression treaty. It required that the United States offer a verbal guarantee unilaterally after its first proposal was refused. The United States insisted any security guarantee should be signed by the multiple sides, including the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan, in order to prevent such a guarantee from restricting itself in case of any contingency.

Fourth, if any agreement cannot be reached, will the inspection of the DPRK's nuclear facilities be limited or unlimited? The DPRK indicated that the sites and times of inspections should be limited, while the United States wants any suspected sites inspected and for those inspections to be carried out at any time.

Fifth, how would the DPRK's nuclear arsenal and materials be dealt with if and when its nuclear program is abolished?

The United States has suggested any nuclear weapons should be destroyed outside of the DPRK, while the DPRK has insisted it should be permitted to maintain a "nuclear deterrence capability" until normalization of DPRK-US relations.

Sixth, should the nuclear issue on the Korea Peninsula be resolved as a "package" or with limitation?

The DPRK advocates the former, which means all the political, economic, security and diplomatic issues should be resolved through abolishing its nuclear plans. But the United States has suggested the security issue be solved first, with the others to follow later.

Due to the contradictions between the two major parties concerned, it is very difficult to see how either side might compromise. Helping achieve that compromise is the vital role played by the other four parties and tests the political wisdom of the related parties.

They should study the advocates of the DPRK and the United States carefully and put forward a just, reasonable and practical resolution considering the interests of both sides according to the nature of this issue.

This resolution proposal should follow four basic principles, namely, the issue should be resolved by the same approach simultaneously within limited a period, phase by phase.

Limited time can prevent this issue from going too far.

The same approach means that the measures taken by both sides should be equal in terms of approach. For example, verbal promises would be the response to verbal promises. Guarantees would be the response to guarantees. And actions would be the response to actions.

The measures of same approach should be taken at the same time. However, the complicated issue could be solved step by step, started from the easiest and most urgent part.

The root of the nuclear issue derives from the shadow of the Cold War in the Korean Peninsula, and mutual distrust remains the biggest impediment.

Every step forward needs some "give-and-take" from parties concerned, particularly the DPRK and the United States.

(China Daily March 15, 2004)