The United States should first seek a return of UN weapons inspectors to Iraq before taking any further steps, US Secretary of State Colin Powell said in comments broadcast Sunday.
Powell's comments highlighted sharp differences within the Bush administration over how to deal with the Iraq crisis. Last week, Vice President Cheney, making his case for a pre-emptive strike to topple Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, said resuming inspections could be counterproductive.
"The president has been clear that he believes weapons inspectors should return," Powell said in an excerpt aired by the British Broadcasting Corp. The BBC will air the full interview in a week.
"Iraq has been in violation of these many UN resolutions for most of the last 11 or so years. So as a first step, let's see what the inspectors find, send them back in, why are they being kept out."
But, he added, "we should not think that the inspections in and of themselves might give us the kind of assurance that we could take to the bank."
US President Bush has said his priority is to remove Saddam, whom Washington accuses of terrorism and developing weapons of mass destruction. Debate has increased over the possibility of military action to oust the Iraqi leader.
Asked about Powell's comments, White House spokesman Scott McClellan said Sunday there is no difference between Powell's position and that of Bush. The president agrees that "unfettered inspections" are a required first step but not necessarily enough, he said.
Inspections are "no guarantee if at the same time the regime in Iraq continues to try to hide weapons of mass destruction," McClellan said.
Cheney said last week that inspectors "would provide no assurance whatsoever" of compliance and might even bring "false comfort" that Saddam had been contained.
Iraq has refused to allow UN arms inspectors into the country for nearly four years. UN resolutions require the inspectors to certify that Baghdad is no longer trying to develop biological, chemical or nuclear weapons.
(China Daily September 2, 2002)
|