In the current Iran nuclear crisis, the American role as an onlooker seems more eye-catching compared with that of the EU, who is caught in a dilemma in the face of Iran's aggressive attitude. However, Bush's recent threat of using force serves more a psychological deterrent than a real one.

The Iran nuclear issue is in nature a question of Iran-US relations. Going into his second term, US President George W. Bush made important adjustments to his hard line on Iran. In last March, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice expressed the hope in an announcement that the Iran nuclear issue be solved through peaceful means, turning from opposing to supporting the Iran-EU negotiations. Washington also decided on no longer opposing Iran's bid to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). Bush himself made it clear not long ago that Iran, unlike the North Korea, can develop its nuclear energy for civilian use, a mark that Washington has withdraw from opposing all Iranian nuclear projects, including those for civilian use, to only against uranium enrichment.

The Bush administration has softened its attitude towards Iran, shifting from "stick" alone to "stick plus carrot." There are many reasons behind that, but the most important is probably realistic pressure. At the moment, Washington has little choice in its Iran policy, and sanction or attack cannot be put on the table. In fact, the US simply cannot afford the launch of another large-scale military operation.

Firstly, both the US and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) failed to find any evidence of irregular nuclear activities in Iran. Even if Iran resumed uranium conversion work, it is still within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Secondly, compared with Iraq, Iran is of much bigger national strength and cohesion, larger land and population and possesses ballistic missiles that can hit Israel and US military bases in the Gulf. As situation in Iraq suggested, it is easy to topple a regime, but not to build up a new one. More important, Iran is holding an ever bigger bargaining counter against the US as security in Iraq keeps worsening while Iran is getting closer with Iraq's Shiite government.

Thirdly, Iran's nuclear facilities are scattered and concealed which, most experts believe, cannot be completely destroyed even by surgical strikes.

Fourth, except for Israel, a strike against Iran can hardly win any international support or form an alliance.

However, the US adjustment in Iran policy is fundamentally tactical instead of strategic, which is aimed at three purposes.

First, to form a united front with EU to prevent Iran from driving a wedge between them and to improve relations with the other parties across the Atlantic. As a matter of fact, Washington doesn't expect much from the EU-Iran negotiation, even looking forward to a failure, because in that case it will have a chance to drag EU into its own track of Iran policy and force EU to recognize its dominant status.

Second, to freeze Iran's uranium enrichment activities through diplomatic means, temporarily or permanently so as to postpone Iran's nuclear process. This is a favored option when the US is not strong enough to strike.

Third, to internationalize the Iran nuclear issue through diplomatic means, and win international support for further actions. Meanwhile, diplomatic negotiations will show the world the US sincerity, and further isolate Iran if the talks collapse.

Judging from the current situation, the US has reached part of its goals. But whether the US and EU can joint efforts and whether the US can dominate in solving the issue, we have to wait and see.

(People's Daily August 23, 2005)