Considered in the light of historical factors, inter-Korean relations and US-North Korean relations have always been intertwined, resulting in either virtuous or vicious outcomes. Calm US–North Korean relations contribute to developing favorable inter-Korean relationships, while an impasse in US-North Korean relations tends to have adverse effects on inter-Korean affairs.

Reflecting back to June 2000, South Korean leader Kim Dae-jung and North Korean leader Kim Jong II held an historical summit in Pyongyang. The meeting resulted in a Joint North-South Declaration and hope for peaceful reconciliation on the Korean peninsula was high. Exchanges across the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and between the US and North Korea flourished. North Korean Special Envoy General Jo Myong-rok visited the US in October 2000, and Madeleine Albright made a return visit later that month. There was even talk of President Clinton making a visit at the close of his term. The year 2000 witnessed an improvement of both US-North Korean relations and North Korea–South Korean relations.

However, US-North Korean relations cooled once President George W. Bush took office in January 2001. Perhaps the new administration was simply trying to create some distance from Clinton's legacy of successes. In March 2001, the Bush administration publicly cast doubt on the Sunshine Policy and said that a policy review was necessary before further US-North Korean negotiations could resume. Bush’s hard-line policies towards North Korea, such as ceasing dialogue with North Korea and strong diplomatic rhetoric attacking on North Korean leader Kim Jong II and his social policies, created a strong atmosphere of mistrust.

Against this backdrop, Bush’s hard-line stance not only stalled dialogue between the US and North Korea, but also interrupted Inter-Korean negotiations. North Korea stormed out of ministerial level talks between the ROK and DPRK in November 2001. Both US-North Korean relations and North Korea and South Korea relations entered a phase of limited collaboration.

Then came Sept.11. It is clear that the international order following Sept. 11 complicated US policy towards North Korea. In an effort to build a powerful international coalition against terrorism, Washington has rearranged its entire foreign policy. Issues that used to have high priority have been downgraded, losing their urgency. North Korea appears to be one such issue. It seems the peninsula has moved from center of Washington's political and military periscope. There are strong indications of hardening US foreign policy, and one can only presume this will also extend to future dealings with North Korea.

In this regard, the Sept.11 attacks gave new reasons for Bush’s hawkish Korean policy, with his administration taking an even tougher stance on North Korea. On January 29, Bush listed North Korea along with Iraq, Iran as an “axils-of-evil,” accusing them with harboring weapons of massive destruction and threatening the safety of the US, a line of rhetoric which Bush has repeated many times since. Bush’s axils-of-evil premise certainly provoked strong opposition from DPRK and North Korean media describing Mr. Bush as a moral leper, and the US as an empire of evil, heightening the rhetorical mêlée.

At the same time, these events have raised concerns from US allies -- Japan and South Korea -- with the elevated prospect of renewed confrontation on the divided and still volatile peninsula. Bush drew sharp criticism from ROK because Bush’s words dealt a fresh blow to President Kim Dae-jung's efforts to re-engage the North at a time when the momentum of inter-Korean relations had been faltering. South Koreans believe that Bush’s hard-line policies have not only frozen American dialogue with Pyongyang but also undermined peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

In a bid to reassure South Korea, Bush made his first visit to the country this February. In view of the doubts held by the ROK after Bush’s speech on the axils-of-evil, the President had to work hard to relieve anti-US sentiments in South Korea and repair US-South Korean relations. He said the US will faithfully keep its word to safeguard the security of South Korea and offer strong support for the peace process on the Korean Peninsula. In addition, Bush confirmed his support for South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's engagement policy. Maybe Bush and his administration have finally realized that for the sake of continued close US-ROK relations, Washington must be seen as a supporter, not a critic, of reconciliation between the two Koreas.

Since Kim Dae Jung took power, he has been pursuing his so-called Sunshine Policy aiming to realize full and persistent cooperation with North Korea. It is clear that the Sunshine Policy and axils-of-evil are two quite contradictory concepts. Although Bush has tried his best to dissolve the anxieties caused by his speech, and expressed his will to talk with DPRK, his previous statements have still not been retracted, and his deep distrust of North Korea continues. Obviously South Korea has been particularly worried by the situation on the peninsula and talk of a severe crisis in 2003 has been increasing. Preventative measure to avoid a crisis on the Korean Peninsula became the highest priority for both Koreas. It was Seoul's persistent evenhanded (and open hearted) approach toward the North that persuaded Pyongyang to come around, despite (rather than because of) Bush's confrontational policies. Besides, South Korea is well aware that it must help improve ties between the United States and North Korea in order for the budding detente on the Korean Peninsula to flourish.

In an effort to reduce tensions, the ROK sent special envoy Lim Dong-won, President Kim Dae-jung's special adviser on security and unification affairs, to North Korea this April. He reached consensus with North Korean leaders and laid the groundwork for a resumption of stalled relations between South and North Korea. Lim Dong-won also passed messages to North Korea that both the US and Japan want to return to the negotiating table. Lim’s Pyongyang tour proved relatively successful with the two sides declaring a series of treaties and issuing a number of joint statements. Talks even continued in spite of naval clashes between the two countries. In mid-August, the seventh ministerial meeting held in Seoul resulted in ten treaties, and tensions on the Korean Peninsula continued to thaw.

Immediately following the September 11 attacks, North Korea quickly issued a statement denouncing the terrorist attack on the US and later ratified a UN anti-terrorism treaty. North Korea repeated its position on more than one occasion, but it also left no doubt that it strongly opposes military strikes against Afghanistan. North Korea then established diplomatic relations with a number of EU countries, expanding its international scope. During the ASEAN meeting of foreign ministers at the end of July, North Korea adopted a flexible and pragmatic foreign policy. North Korean foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun held separate talks with America's Secretary of State Colin Powell and Japan’s Foreign Minister in Brunei. During the talks, North Korea invited a US special envoy to visit the country and called for a resumption of Japan-North Korean dialogue. Although the US special envoy has not confirmed a date, US-North Korean relations appear to be better than when Bush delivered his State of Union Speech. What’s more, generals from both North Korea and South Korea held talks in Panmunjom in August. Both sides agreed to solve problems through friendly dialogues. To date, probably the most significant achievement has been the Japanese Prime Minister’s successful visit to North Korea on September 17.

Upon reviewing the changes that have taken place on the Korea Peninsula since Sept.11, 2000, it’s not hard to see that hard-line policies do little more than raise tensions while flexible dialogue will contribute to real peace and stability within the region. It is in the interest of both South Korea and North Korea to promote peace on the Korean Peninsula.

The key point for the Korean Peninsula is to maintain peace and development, which should also be the central theme of the whole world. It is worth noting that the common desire of the international community is growing with all parties wanting the Korean Peninsula to continue its peaceful trend. The world is looking forward to seeing substantially more progresses in the Korean Peninsula.

(china.org.cn, translated by Zheng Guihong, September 30, 2002)