The People's Republic of China was founded more than half a century ago and has an army of 2.5 million soldiers, yet its survival still faces a grave threat from separatism.

In terms of defence priorities, the Chinese Government considers the battle against separatism second only to thwarting foreign invasion. Although separatist forces also exist in a few regions in China, the biggest threat to the country is Taiwan separatism, which has also proven to be the most dangerous.

An independent Taiwan would leave China exposed to the same threat as the former Soviet Union, which disintegrated in chaos following separation of its three Baltic republics. In such a scenario, far from concentrating on its strategic goal of peaceful rise, China might even run the risk of disintegration and national downfall.

Taiwan separatism has posed a grave, practical and pressing threat to China for some time. In 1992, former Taiwan leader Lee Teng-hui began to covertly promote Taiwan independence under the guise of his "neo-Taiwanese Campaign." In 1999, Lee put forward the "two states" theory to publicly advocate Taiwan independence.

After pro-independence Chen Shui-bian was elected "leader" of the island in 2000, the Taiwan administration began to speed up its push for de jure independence. In 2003, Taiwan authorities outlined their plan for referendum legislation in 2004, the completion of "constitutional changes" in 2006 and the implementation of a new "constitution" in 2008 to declare formal independence.

The US military support for the regime on the island has aggravated separatist activities. Whether a separatist campaign can succeed hinges on the relative military strengths of Taiwan separatist forces and the central government. Without external military support, it will be very difficult for the separatist faction to militarily force the central government to accept independence. But if the external military forces who support Taiwan separatism are stronger than what the central government can muster, there will be a growing possibility of the success of the separatist forces.

Peacefully removing the threat of Taiwan separatism is dependent on three conditions.

First, the Taiwan authorities must abandon their goal of pursuing independence. Second, the United States must withdraw its military support for Taiwan. Third, the Chinese mainland must effectively deter Taiwan independence.

Since 1992, when Lee Teng-hui began to promote Taiwan independence in a covert way, the nature of the cross-Straits dispute has changed from the fight for regime legitimacy to the fight for sovereignty. Even if the Kuomintang Party and People First Party win the "presidential" elections in 2004, the new Taiwan administration will continue on the road towards Taiwan independence, but only slower (than the present Democratic Progressive Party administration). So the Taiwan authorities cannot be expected to voluntarily abandon the aim of independence.

On the other hand, the United States will never stop its military support for the Taiwan administration due to America's containment strategy towards Chinese mainland. So the basis for peacefully removing the threat of Taiwan separatism should be strengthening the military deterrent against independence.

Whether or not the Taiwan authorities dare declare formal independence depends on the US determination to go to war with Chinese mainland on the issue. Whether or not the mainland can effectively deter Taiwan independence relies on Beijing's determination to safeguard national unity at any cost.

The policy of peacefully eliminating the threat of Taiwan separatism needs two clearly-defined strategic tasks for different phases: curbing separatism and achieving reunification. Curbing separatism needs military measures while achieving reunification can rely on peaceful means.

Curbing separatism and peaceful reunification are not based on each other. Instead, the former is the basis for the latter while the latter is the result of the former. Only after effectively curbing separatism through military deterrence can peaceful reunification be realized.

Failure to differentiate between the two tasks tends to result in ignorance about the logic that fulfillment of the two different tasks requires different strategies and even the fact that curbing separatism and peaceful reunification are opposite goals, to some degree.

A simultaneous adoption of the two strategies may very possibly make them counteract each other. The dialectic relationship between curbing separatism and peaceful reunification is that a peaceful reunification can be achieved if China has the determination and capability to go to war, whereas China will be faced with a higher risk of war and reduced opportunities for its peaceful rise.

(China Daily March 2, 2004)