By Wu Hongying

Behind the front page headlines of local protests throughout his Latin American trip, US President George W. Bush was persistent in demonstrating his policy readjustment in the region.

From March 8 through 14, Bush visited Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia, Guatemala and Mexico. The week-long tour of the five Latin American nations was an indication that a major readjustment of Washington's Latin American policies was under way.

Bush's Latin American trip should be seen as an unusual diplomatic tour de force. Both the duration and scale of the trip exceeded all his previous trips to Latin America, which usually saw him landing in one or two countries and staying for only a few hours. This time, he spent a whole week paying official visits to five countries, unprecedented in every sense of the word.

The five countries he visited had been painstakingly selected. They include the top two nations in the region (Brazil and Mexico rank first and second in GDP) as well as two less powerful countries (Uruguay and Guatemala).

Mexico and Colombia are US allies, while Brazil, Uruguay and Guatemala are the United States' friends. Even their political colors are different right-wing governments in Colombia, Mexico and Guatemala, and left-leaning moderates in Paraguay and Uruguay. In geographical terms, there is the United States' southern neighbor (Mexico), one country in Central America (Guatemala) and three in South America (Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay).

These carefully picked destinations reflect the Bush administration's intention to improve its relations with Latin American countries as a whole. The topics of Bush's talks with his hosts were nation-specific, showing Washington's concern over different issues with each of the five.

Bush's meeting with Brazilian President de Lula focused on cooperation in ethanol development since Brazil is the leading ethanol producing country in Latin America. His talks with Uruguayan President Tabare Vazquez were mainly about free trade because Uruguay is keen to improve trade ties with the United States.

In Colombia, Bush's talks with President Alvaro Uribe Velez centered on fighting terrorism and drug trafficking, because the host country hopes the United States will continue its support for the Colombia Plan. And his talks with Guatemalan President Oscar Berger emphasized immigration and labor policies, the focus of bilateral disputes.
 
The top issues Bush discussed with Mexican President Calderon were immigration, drugs and border security, areas the United States can sink its teeth into. All this shows major administration efforts behind the Latin American trip.

The trip was designed to mend rifts between the United States and Latin American countries against an unusual backdrop. Bush declared soon after taking office that the United States considered its relations with Latin American countries, especially with Mexico, more important than other diplomatic ties.

However, after 9/11, the United States shifted its strategic focus to the war on terror, and Latin America lost significance in Washington's global strategy.

Meanwhile, as the economy in Latin America improved and the wish to be free from US influence grew, Latin America's left wing rose fast.

Last year saw a large number of leftist parties winning general elections or re-election in Latin America. Venezuelan President Chavez's recent actions are particularly noteworthy.

Chavez has been publicly challenging US supremacy by rallying support for regional integration, leaning on oil resources and ties with the Southern Common Market (Mercosur). Chavez not only expanded his influence in the world as well as the region but also formed an "axis of conscience" with Cuba and Bolivia. One result has been increasing Washington concern over the disturbance in its backyard.

The growing Western Hemisphere presence of third parties such as China and Russia has also added to US concern that it is losing control.

Largely for these reasons the United States found itself reassessing the region's place in its global strategy in a bid to readjust its Latin American policies. The strategies are to reenter its backyard, pull back Latin American slippage, and isolate the leftist flag bearer Venezuelan President Chavez. The Bush administration is hoping to reduce domestic political pressure while securing US strategic interests and leadership in Latin America.

A White House spokesperson announced before Bush embarked on his Latin American trip that the president "will emphasize America's commitment to the Western Hemisphere and push for common itineraries conducive to the promotion of our freedom, prosperity and social justice". Judging by the result of this trip, Bush did not return empty-handed, though he failed to achieve all his goals.

First, his visit rekindled Latin Americans' expectations in the United States. In the past year or so, Bush has sent a string of senior Washington officials down south to discuss issues of common concern, such as immigration, counter-terrorism, free trade and military cooperation, presenting new plans and measures.

Bush also announced an aid package worth several hundred million dollars before setting off for Latin America. He followed up during the trip with repeated promises of goodwill, giving Latin Americans the impression that the United States was refocusing on the region.

Second, he managed to strengthen US relations with some of the Latin American countries by convincing them to oppose some of the leftist leaders. This is in synch with Washington's efforts in recent years to contain the spreading leftist movement.

On this trip Bush succeeded in forging a strategic ethanol alliance with the largest moderate leftist government in Latin America led by Brazilian President de Lula and winning over the Uruguayan government, another moderate left-leaning administration, with a free trade agreement.

By playing these hands he achieved some improvement in US relations with moderate leftists while isolating some hardliners.

At the same time, this trip also reinforced Washington's ties with its economic ally Mexico and military ally Colombia.

Lastly, Bush made full use of the energy resources trump card. This was highlighted by the signing of the Brazil-US Memorandum on Ethanol Fuel Cooperation. It can be seen as a de facto strategic ethanol alliance between the two counties based on the US advantage in corn-to-ethanol technology.

This alliance will not only allow the US to enjoy future leadership in the Latin American ethanol market but also tie Brazil, with the region's leading energy resources, firmly to America's chariot. It could also reduce future US reliance on Venezuelan oil.

The most important signal sent out by Bush's Latin American visit is that the US has begun to readjust its Latin American policies. In fact, this policy readjustment started early last year with the appointment of Thomas Shannon Jr, an old hand in Latin American affairs, as assistant secretary of state for western hemisphere affairs.

The readjustment of Washington's Latin American policies picked up pace with the Shannon appointment. Related political moves included the appointment of another Latin American affairs expert, John Negroponte, as undersecretary of state; the establishment of a special office to gather intelligence on Cuba and Venezuela; gearing up contacts with power circles in Latin American countries; and increasing the US diplomatic offensive in the region.

On the economic side, Washington has increased financial input in Latin America, as seen in the climb to US$1.6 billion in financial assistance for Latin America. This is a 4 percent increase over the current year in the 2008 budget that Bush presented to Congress.

On March 5, in his address to members of the Latin American Chamber of Commerce in the US, Bush made particular mention of the Millennium Challenge Project, saying the US would make it a key task to help Latin America alleviate poverty.

In military affairs, the United States has strengthened its cooperation with Latin American armed forces, for example by providing training for Latin American military personnel. Also noteworthy is Washington's designation of 2007 as the Year of Latin American Contact.

As US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns explained at the time, 2007 is the "year for US commitments" to Latin America, "a year for the US to do more for Latin American countries and a year for more communication".

Clearly the United States will attach more importance and direct more input to Latin America in a bid to reduce friction.

But, as there are still many areas, including immigration, counter-terrorism, anti-drug operations, energy resources and the Americas free trade zone, where the US finds itself at odds with Latin American nations, it will be very difficult for Washington to resolve differences in the near future. That means we will not see any tangible improvement in the lukewarm relations between the United States and Latin America any time soon.

The author is a researcher and director of the Latin America Studies Division of the China Institute of Modern International Relations.

(China Daily March 21, 2007)