August 15, the anniversary of the day after Emperor Hirohito accepted terms of surrender in the Postdam Declaration in 1945, is approaching.

Now the question arises: Will Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi pay visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Japan's war dead, including 14 Class A war criminals, on August 15 this year, the 61st anniversary of the end of World War II in Asia-Pacific?

There has been widespread speculation as to what will happen, but people generally agree that there are three possibilities.

First, Koizumi might refrain from visiting the war shrine, trying not to cause trouble for his political heir, since it is now apparent that the Japanese citizens opposed to the prime minister's shrine visit outnumber those in favor of the visit.

Second, the prime minister might perform the visit perfunctorily in a largely ceremonial way, as he did last year, when Koizumi, in common suit, paid a visit but stopped short of entering deep into the shrine compound. This is merely to show that he fulfilled his promise of shrine visit.

Third, Koizumi, staking all his political assets, might go all out for a full-fledged visit, making good on his pledge to visit Yasukuni on August 15, which is likely to be his last visit as prime minister. It should be kept in mind that Koizumi steered clear of August 15, a sensitive date, in all of his previous Yasukuni visits.

In case Koizumi's August 15 shrine visit indeed becomes reality, there would be a large following, including parliament members and some members of the general public. In this way, Koizumi actually stages a showdown with the Japanese who are opposed to the visit and with the countries in Japan's neighborhood, which were victims of Japanese aggression or colonial rule.

In this scenario, Koizumi could stoke extra-nationalist feelings among the Japanese public and challenge China and the Republic of Korea.

For a long time, Koizumi has twisted the issue of his war shrine visits into a matter of whether Japan should bend to the "pressure from China." It, therefore, follows that those Japanese who disagree with the prime minister's war shrine visit favor submission to China. A climate is thus created in which those who are opposed to the shrine visits are traitors.

The last choice is doubtlessly the worst one. Three factors probably drive Koizumi along this road.

First, the Japanese economy is in good form current and Koizumi's approval rating remains high.

The economy is a vitally important factor that determines the approval ratings of Japanese leaders. But the good economic situation is not so much attributed to Koizumi's economic policy as to a stroke of his good luck.

The No 1 stimulus for Japan's economic recovery comes from the enormous demand from China. Moreover, the US economy, the world's economic locomotive, is also doing well.

But all in all, it was during Koizumi's tenure that the Japanese economy started making a turn for the better. This, coupled by Koizumi's publicity efforts, easily leads the Japanese public to believe that the incumbent prime minister is worth supporting.

Second, the influence of the overwhelming victory scored by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in the general election last September lingers on. If that marked the victory at the showdown with the domestic opposition, now it is time to stage a diplomatic coup. The premiership of Koizumi would be thus rounded off by victories in both domestic and international arenas.

Third, the nice treat Koizumi enjoyed during his US visit and the praises US President George W. Bush lavished on him are enough to make him feel buoyant.

In spite of the fact that US public opinion resents the attitudes of some Japanese politicians towards the trials at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and is critical of Koizumi's war shrine visits, George W. Bush, a realist, however, will not put the matters of historical and moral right and wrong before the United States' interests.

However, the Yasukuni Shrine issue goes beyond the scope of China-Japan relations. Japanese leaders' war shrine visits not only sting the feelings of the Chinese but also aim to reverse the historical verdict on the war launched by Japanese militarists. The United States, which played a primary role in the trials of the Far East tribunal, actually bears the brunt of such verdict-reversing attempts.

Conservative Japanese politicians over the last decades have basically acknowledged that the war against China was aggression and that Japan imposed colonial rule on Korea. But what they are most reluctant to acknowledge is the fatally erroneous decision to provoke the war with the United States. The exhibits in the Yasukuni Shrine, for example, have connotations obviously targeting the United States. So, we can safely draw the conclusion that conservative Japanese politicians largely have the United States in mind when interpreting the history of World War II.

Koizumi is merely a political gambler, not a politician with strategic insight and perspective.

Koizumi pales beside a number of Japan's post-war prime ministers: Yusuhiro Nakasone, as prime minister from 1982-87, stood out with his strategic perspective involving Japan-China relations; Kakuei Tanaka came to Beijing in 1972 to establish formal diplomatic relations with China; Tanzan Ishibashi (1956-57) excelled in political farsightedness.

In addition, the patent of pushing for structural reform in Japan as an "ordinary country" belongs to Seiji Maehara, head of Japan's major opposition, the Democratic Party, who stands more than a cut above Koizumi in terms of strategic wisdom.

Though the Chinese Government never refuses to have dealings with conservative and right-wing Japanese politicians, the Chinese leadership finds it hard to reason with a political gambler whose head is reason-proof.

Japanese economist Yutaka Kosai observed that co-operation with China on environmental issues, energy saving initiatives and in other respects is the biggest issue Japan has to address in the 21st century.

His remarks reflect farsightedness.

He continued to say that Japan-China relations cannot afford any more twists and turns.

If Koizumi is bent on having his way and chooses to visit the war shrine on August 15 on the eve of his exit from the prime minister's office in a bid to fan nationalist feelings among the Japanese public, he will end up in becoming a historical sinner.

(China Daily August 13, 2006)