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Since the end of the cold
war the international security situation has tended to relax, and great
advances have been made in international arms control and disarmament.
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC) was concluded
in January 1993, and came into effect in April 1997. The Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was indefinitely extended in
May, 1995. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened
for signature in the New York UN headquarters in September 1996. Nuclear-weapon-free
zones continue to expand. The Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons and the
Amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines,
Booby-Traps and Other Devices attached to the Convention on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention
on Certain Conventional Weapons) were adopted in October 1995 and May
1996, respectively. And in June 1997, the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) passed a protocol for the purpose of increasing the effectiveness
of safeguards.
But in spite of such progress,
there are still some problems crying out for solutions in the sphere of
disarmament. The United States and Russia still keep their large nuclear
arsenals. In addition, a few military powers continue to stick to their
cold war mentality and nuclear deterrence policy, strenuously developing
highly advanced and sophisticated weapons, especially advanced missile
defense systems. The nuclear tests conducted by India, and then by Pakistan,
in May 1998 have not only seriously impeded international non-proliferation
efforts, but have produced a grave impact on regional and world peace
and stability.
The Chinese government highly
stresses the importance of arms control and disarmament work, and takes
it as an important component of its overall diplomacy and defense policy.
The Chinese government holds that the international community should promote
fair, rational, comprehensive and balanced arms control and disarmament;
the purpose of disarmament should be to reinforce, not weaken or undermine,
the security of all countries; the universality of the international arms
control treaties should be enhanced; new treaties should be concluded
through a broadly representative multilateral negotiations mechanism;
those countries having the largest and most sophisticated conventional
and nuclear arsenals should continue to fulfil their special responsibilities
for disarmament; efforts should be made to prevent a few countries directing
the target of disarmament at a broad spectrum of developing countries
in order to deprive them of their legitimate right and means for self-defense,
at the same time taking advantage of their own advanced military technology
and superior economic strength to seek absolute security and military
superiority; the existing discriminatory and exclusive export control
mechanisms and arrangements should be overhauled and rectified comprehensively,
and a fair and rational international non-proliferation system should
be set up through negotiations on the basis of universal participation.
China has steadfastly attended
multilateral negotiations on arms control and disarmament, and some related
international conferences. In April 1997, China and Russia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed the Agreement on Mutual Reduction of
Military Forces in the Border Areas. It stipulates that the five countries
shall reduce their military forces in the border areas to the minimum
level compatible with their friendly and good-neighborly relations, a
level that shall not go beyond their defense needs; none of the parties
shall use or threaten to use force against the other party or parties,
neither shall they seek unilateral military superiority; they shall reduce
and limit the size of their ground force, air force, air aviation and
border guard units as well as the quantity of main categories of their
armaments and military equipment deployed in the border areas as deep
as 100 kilometers from their border; they shall determine the ceilings
for the reduced size, modality and the time limit for the reduction of
military forces; combat vessels shall not be deployed in rivers in the
above-mentioned areas; they shall exchange relevant information and data
on the military forces in the border areas; and they shall monitor and
verify the implementation of the Agreement. China has also set up bilateral
arms control consultation mechanisms with many other countries. China
has signed or ratified almost all the multilateral arms control treaties,
and faithfully fulfilled its obligations under those treaties, making
a positive contribution to the progress of international arms control
and disarmament.
The Issue of
Nuclear Weapons
As a nuclear-weapon state,
China vigorously supports and participates in the international non-nuclear
proliferation efforts, promotes the process of nuclear disarmament and
works hard for the realization of the final goal of the complete prohibition
and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons worldwide.
China has consistently advocated
the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.
At the 51st Session of the UN General Assembly in 1996 China clearly put
forward a five-point proposal on nuclear disarmament: 1. The major nuclear
powers should abandon the nuclear deterrence policy, and the states having
the largest nuclear arsenals should continue to drastically reduce their
nuclear weapons stockpiles; 2. all nuclear-weapon states should commit
themselves not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and
in any circumstances, undertake unconditionally not to use or threaten
to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free
zones, and conclude a legally binding international document as soon as
possible; 3. all states which have deployed nuclear weapons outside their
borders should withdraw all these weapons home, and all nuclear-weapon
states should pledge to support the proposal on establishing nuclear-weapon-free
zones, respect the status of such zones and undertake corresponding obligations;
4. no state should develop or deploy outer space weapons or missile defense
systems, which harm strategic security and stability; 5. all states should
negotiate and conclude an international convention on the complete prohibition
and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.
From the first day it possessed
nuclear weapons, China has solemnly declared its determination not to
be the first to use such weapons at any time and in any circumstances,
and later undertook unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear
weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones.
China vigorously supports the efforts of the relevant countries to establish
nuclear-free zones on a voluntary basis, and has signed and approved the
relevant protocols of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific
Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free
Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba). In April 1995 China issued an official
statement, reiterating its commitment to unconditionally provide non-nuclear-weapon
states and nuclear-weapon-free zones with negative security assurance,
and for the first time promised to provide them with positive security
assurance.
In March 1992 China acceded
to the NPT and has faithfully fulfilled its international obligations
to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and made contributions
to the indefinite extension of the treaty. China was represented at the
negotiations on the CTBT from beginning to end, and signed it on September
24, 1996, the first day the treaty was opened for signature. China supports
the early conclusion of the Convention on Banning the Production of Fissile
Materials for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices (FMCT).
For this purpose, the foreign ministers of China and the United States
issued a joint statement in October 1994, saying that the two countries
would make joint efforts to promote an early conclusion of a multilateral,
non-discriminatory and effectively verifiable FMCT. In April 1997, China
and four other nuclear-weapon states -- the United States, Russia, Britain
and France -- issued a statement, reiterating their stand for concluding,
through negotiation, a FMCT as soon as possible on the basis of the mandate
contained in the Shannon Report. China supports the IAEA's Program for
Strengthening the Effectiveness and Promoting the Efficiency of the Safeguard
System (93 + 2 Program), and promises that, on the basis of voluntary
safeguard, China will negotiate and conclude with the IAEA a legally binding
document at a proper time, and will adopt measures corresponding to the
obligations China undertakes in accordance with the first article of the
NPT.
As the international situation
is tending to relax and relations between the major powers continue to
improve, China believes that the conditions are now ripe for nuclear-weapon
states to undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against
each other. So, in January 1994, China formally presented a draft for
the Treaty on the Non-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons to the United States,
Russia, Britain and France, proposing that the five nuclear-weapon states
hold discussions on the treaty as soon as possible. China holds that such
a treaty will help to promote mutual trust among nuclear-weapon states
and further reduce the danger of nuclear war. While energetically promoting
negotiations for conclusion of a multilateral treaty, China also actively
seeks, together with other nuclear-weapon states, to undertake, on a bilateral
basis, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other.
So far, China and Russia have already made such a promise to each other.
The Issue of
Chemical and Biological Weapons
The Chinese government has
always stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of
chemical weapons. China signed the CWC in January 1993, ratified the convention
in December 1996 and deposited the instruments of ratification on April
25, 1997, thus becoming an original signatory state to the CWC. China
supports the purpose and goals of the CWC, and advocates that chemical
weapons and facilities for their production should be destroyed as soon
as possible, in accordance with the related provisions in the CWC. Meanwhile,
China holds that the convention should promote international economic,
trade, and scientific and technological exchanges in the field of chemical
industry, ensuring that chemical industry technology truly benefits mankind.
China has been active and
conscientious in fulfilling the obligations stipulated in the CWC. It
delivered the initial declaration and annual declaration in time and in
their entirety and has accepted inspections by the convention. It has
also participated in every one of the convention's executive council meetings
and the two conferences of states parties.
China has been a victim of
chemical weapons. Large quantities of chemical weapons abandoned by Japanese
aggressor troops are found in China to this day, which still threaten
the lives and property of the local people and the environment in which
they live. In view of this, China demands that, in keeping with the stipulations
of the convention, any country that has left chemical weapons in another
country destroy, as soon as possible, such weapons wholly and thoroughly.
China advocates the complete
prohibition and thorough destruction of biological weapons. It opposes
the production, development and stockpiling of biological weapons by any
country, and the proliferation of such weapons and related technology
in any form by any country. In November 1984 China acceded to the Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC). As a state
party to the BWC, China has fully and conscientiously fulfilled its obligations
under the convention. Since 1987 China has, year after year, reported
to the United Nations on convention-related information and data concerning
confidence-building measures, in accordance with the decisions of the
Review Conferences of the BWC.
Having suffered grievously
from biological weapons attacks in the past, China supports work that
helps comprehensively to strengthen the effectiveness of the convention.
It has actively participated in the work of drawing up a Protocol of the
Ad Hoc Group of States Parties to the BWC established in 1994, and has
made contributions to the progress of the negotiations on the Protocol.
China holds, in view of the complexity of the problems relating to the
verification mechanism, that every country should, in a down-to-earth
way, seek effective and feasible verification measures, and formulate
concrete steps to prevent abuse of verification, and to protect the rightful
commercial and security secrets of states parties. China considers that,
while improving the convention's verification mechanism, international
cooperation and exchanges among states parties in the sphere of bio-technology
for peaceful purposes should also be strengthened.
The Issue of
Keeping Outer Space Weapon-Free
Outer space belongs to all
mankind, and should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes to benefit
mankind. To this end, China stands for the complete prohibition and thorough
destruction of weapons deployed in outer space. It opposes the development
of anti-satellite weapons. China maintains that the international community,
the big powers with the capacity to utilize outer space in particular,
should take the following realistic steps to prevent a weaponized outer
space: A complete ban on weapons of any kind in outer space, including
anti-missile and anti-satellite weapons, so as to keep outer space free
of weapons; a ban on the use of force or conduct of hostilities in, from
or to outer space; and all countries should undertake neither to experiment
with, produce or deploy outer space weapons nor to utilize outer space
to seek strategic advantages on the ground, for example, using disposition
of the important parts of ground anti-missile systems in outer space for
the purpose of developing strategic defensive weapons. In addition, negotiations
should be held as soon as possible for the conclusion of a legally-binding
international agreement with the above-mentioned contents.
Since the beginning of the
1980s, as one of the co-sponsors of the UN General Assembly resolutions
on keeping outer space weapon-free, China has promoted negotiations on
this problem at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament and through other
multilateral mechanisms. As early as at the founding of the Ad Hoc Committee
of the Conference on Disarmament on the Prevention of an Arms Race in
Outer Space, China submitted to it a paper on China's Position on the
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (CD/579). Many countries have
supported China's position.
The Issue of
Anti-Personnel Landmines
China has all along attached
great importance to the problem of threat to innocent people caused by
the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines (APLs). It is in favor
of imposing proper and rational restrictions on the use and transfer of
APLs in a bid to achieve the ultimate objective of comprehensive prohibition
of such landmines through a phased approach. In the meantime, the Chinese
government maintains that, in addressing the problem of APLs, consideration
should be given to both humanitarian concern and the legitimate defense
requirements of sovereign states. To safeguard the safety of their people
by sovereign states through legitimate military means, including the use
of APLs in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter
of the United Nations itself is part and parcel of humanitarianism.
As a country with long land
borders, China has to reserve the right to use APLs on its territory pending
an alternative solution is found and its requirements in security and
defense capability are catered for. China's use of APLs under legitimate
circumstances is entirely aimed at preventing foreign military interference
and aggression so as to maintain national unity and territorial integrity
and safeguard its people's well-being. This not only represents China's
legitimate national security and defense requirements, but also accords
with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations on the
right to self-defense.
The PLA has always exercised
strict control over the use of APLs and prohibited the indiscriminate
use and laying of such landmines while actively studying the possible
alternatives to APLs. China has also actively participated in the revision
of the Landmine Protocol (Protocol II) to the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons (CCW) and the discussions on the question of APLs at the UN Conference
on Disarmament.
The Chinese government has
all along adopted a very prudent and responsible attitude toward landmine
export. In December 1994, China joined in the UN General Assembly's consultation
on its resolution concerning the moratorium on the export of APLs. In
April 1996, the Chinese government solemnly declared its suspension of
export of APLs that are not compatible with those APLs provided for in
the Amended Landmine Protocol to the CCW.
The Chinese government is
of the view that the clearance of APLs is part and parcel of the overall
efforts in eliminating the threat to innocent civilians resulting from
the indiscriminate use of such landmines. It has consistently adopted
a responsible attitude toward post-war demining question and has done
considerable fruitful work in this regard. From the beginning of 1992
to the end of 1994, the PLA conducted its first large-scale demining operation
in the border areas of Yunnan Province and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous
Region, cleared a total of over one million landmines and explosive devices
and destroyed nearly 200 tons of disused or de-activated ammunitions and
explosive devices, covering an area of 108 square kilometers with over
170 border trade passes and ports re-opened, and over 30,000 hectares
of farmland, pasture and mountain forests restored. At the end of 1997,
the Chinese government decided to conduct its second large-scale demining
operation in the above areas starting from November 1997 up to December
1999.
The Chinese government has
always done its utmost to assist APL-affected countries. It furnished
Cambodia and some other mine-affected countries with mine-detection/clearance
equipment, and also helped train demining personnel for these countries,
thus contributing to their smooth post-war rehabilitation. In November
1997, the Chinese President Jiang Zemin declared that China would continue
to actively support international demining efforts and cooperation, including
donation and provision of assistance in the fields of demining training,
technology and equipment through the relevant international demining funds.
The Chinese government also sent observers to participate in the Signing
Ceremony of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction
and the international demining roundtable (Mine Action Forum) held from
2 to 4 December 1997 in Ottawa.
Control of the
Export of Sensitive Materials and Military Equipment
The Chinese government agrees
that necessary measures should be adopted to apply effective international
control to the transfer of sensitive materials and technologies in order
to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their
carriers. However, at the same time, China holds that international efforts
to prevent such proliferation should follow the principle of fairness
and rationality, and opposes a double standard whereby anti-proliferation
is used as a pretext to infringe upon the sovereignty of other countries
and harm normal international cooperation and exchanges in the fields
of economy, trade and science and technology.
China attaches great importance
to control over the export of sensitive materials, and has implemented
a series of administration measures regarding the transfer of sensitive
materials on the basis of international practice.
Regarding nuclear exports,
China, a signatory to the NPT, has pursued a policy of not supporting,
encouraging or engaging in the proliferation of nuclear weapons and not
assisting any other country to develop such weapons. It has laid down
three principles regarding nuclear exports: They should serve peaceful
purposes only; they should accept the safeguards of the IAEA; and they
should not be retransferred to a third country without China's consent.
In November 1991 the Chinese
government declared that it would report on a continuing basis to the
IAEA any export to or import from non-nuclear-weapon states of nuclear
materials of one effective kilogram or above. In July 1993 China officially
promised that it would voluntarily report to the IAEA any imports or exports
of nuclear materials, nuclear equipment and related non-nuclear materials.
In May 1996 China promised that it would not offer help to nuclear facilities
which had not accepted the IAEA's safeguards, including bans on exports
of nuclear materials and personnel or technology exchanges and cooperation.
In May 1997, the Chinese government published the Circular on Questions
Pertaining to the Strict Implementation of China's Nuclear Exports Policy,
which explicitly stipulates that no nuclear materials, facilities or related
technologies exported by China may be supplied to or used by nuclear facilities
which have not accepted the IAEA's safeguards. The circular also has strict
provisions regarding exports of dual-use nuclear-related materials. In
May 1997, China sent observers to attend a meeting of the Zangger Committee,
one of the mechanisms of international nuclear export control, and formally
joined the committee in October of that year. In September 1997, the Chinese
government issued the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on
Nuclear Export Control, banning any kind of assistance to nuclear facilities
which have not accepted the IAEA's safeguards. In addition, nuclear exports
are monopolized by the units designated by the State Council and can not
be operated by any other units or individuals. The state practices a licensing
system for nuclear exports, and has drawn up the Detailed List of Nuclear
Export Control in light of the commonly accepted listings of this kind
in the international sphere. On June 10, 1998, China promulgated the Regulations
on the Control of the Export of Dual-Use Nuclear Materials and Related
Technology, imposing strict control on the export of nuclear-related dual-use
materials and related technology.
China has always been cautious
and responsible regarding the exports administration of chemicals. It
does not export chemicals that can be used to manufacture chemical weapons,
nor does it export related technologies and equipment. It supports normal
international cooperation in chemical industry and exchanges of related
scientific and technological materials in accordance with the CWC, and
opposes any export control mechanism conflicting with the purpose of the
convention.
In September 1990, the Chinese
government drafted measures for strict control of the export of chemicals
and their production technologies and equipment. In December 1995, it
issued the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Supervision
and Control of Chemicals, and, in accordance with these regulations, issued
the List of Chemicals Subject to Supervision and Control and the Bylaws
for the Implementation of the Regulations in June 1996, stipulating that
import and export of related chemicals are under the centralized management
of the competent departments of the chemical industry under the State
Council and operated by special companies designated by such departments.
With regard to the transfer
of military equipment and related technology, China respects the right
of every country to independent or collective self-defense and to acquisition
of weapons for this purpose in accordance with the principles contained
in the Charter of the United Nations, but at the same time it is concerned
about the adverse effects on world security and regional stability arising
from excessive accumulations of weaponry.
For many years until the early
1980s, China did not engage in weapons exports, and since then the volume
of such exports has been limited. Beginning in the mid-1980s, China's
export of military products has been on the decrease: The volume of contracted
business was just over two billion US dollars-worth in 1987, dropped to
US$ 600 million-worth in 1991, and did not exceed one billion US dollars-worth
in the following years. The 1993-97 records of the UN register of conventional
arms exports and imports of various countries show that China's exports
of conventional weapons are small compared to those of some other countries.
China practices strict control
of the transfer of conventional military equipment and related technologies,
and observes the following principles: The export of weapons must help
the recipient nation enhance its capability for legitimate self-defense;
it must not impair peace, security and stability of the relevant region
and the world as a whole; and it must not be used to interfere in the
recipient state's internal affairs. Since 1992 China has participated
in the United Nations' register of conventional arms transfers (Tables
5 and 6).
Table 5 Data of China's
Participation in the United Nations Register of Conventional
Arms Transfers in 1992-1996 (Exports)
Imte |
1992 |
1993 |
1994 |
1995 |
1996 |
Total |
Combat tanks |
97 |
121 |
82 |
51 |
3 |
354 |
Armored cars |
2 |
|
|
|
|
2 |
Large-caliber guns |
166 |
|
|
20 |
18 |
204 |
Operational aircraft |
|
68 |
|
|
5 |
73 |
Attack helicopters |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Naval vessels |
2 |
|
6 |
1 |
5 |
14 |
Missiles and launchers |
24 |
20 |
|
18 |
106 |
168 |
Table 6 Data of China's
Participation in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms Transfers
in 1992-1996 (Imports)
Item |
1992 |
1993 |
1994 |
1995 |
1996 |
Total |
Combat tanks |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Armored cars |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Large-caliber
guns |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Operational
aircraft |
26 |
|
|
|
22 |
48 |
Attack helicopters |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Naval vessels |
|
1 |
|
1 |
|
2 |
Missiles
and launchers |
144 |
|
|
|
|
144 |
In October 1997, the Chinese
government published the Regulations of the People's Republic of China
on the Control of Military Products Export, stipulating that a licensing
system shall be practiced for China's weapons exports, and all external
transfers of domestic military products shall be carried out by the departments
authorized by the government and companies approved and registered by
the government. The Regulations state that the business activities of
such departments and companies must remain strictly within the projects
approved by the government, that contracts of military products transfers
must require approval from the relevant competent government departments
before taking effect, and that important items of arms exports must be
submitted to the State Council and the Central Military Commission for
approval.
China has been consistently
cautious and responsible regarding the transfer of missiles. China is
not a member state of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and
has not joined its formulation and revision, but, in accordance with China's
consistent position on non-proliferation and its principles concerning
arms exports, the Chinese government promised to observe the then guidelines
and parameters of the MTCR in February 1992. In October 1994, China reaffirmed
its promise and undertook the obligation of not exporting ground-to-ground
missiles inherently capable of reaching a range of at least 300 kilometers
with a payload of at least 500 kilograms. In line with the above policy,
China has exercised strict and effective control over the export of missiles
and related materials and has never done anything in violation of its
commitments.
The principles and measures
to prevent the proliferation of weaponry and unwarranted transfers of
military equipment that China has consistently upheld have helped to promote
the development of international arms control and disarmament in a wholesome
way, and to maintain world peace and regional stability.
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